Navya Arma Autonom DL Incident

At Approximately 12:39 PM, the Beep Command Center (BCC) informed the LYNX dispatch center that another autonomous shuttle operating on the same route (VIN: VG9A2CB2CJV[XXX]) was being taken out of service due to insufficient battery charge to continue operation. The BCC later informed LYNX dispatch at 12:49PM that the second shuttle operating on route, P131, would also be returning to storage after the operator completed its current loop. At Approximately 12:52 PM, P131 approached the [XXX] stop within the designated Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) operating lane. The shuttle remained stopped for approximately two (2) and a half minutes while three (3) passengers alighted, and two (2) additional passengers boarded the shuttle. During that period, approximately two (2) minutes after stopping to service passengers, a LYNX bus pulled behind P131. Approximately thirty (30) seconds later, the LYNX bus exited the BRT lane and proceeded into the public travel lane alongside the BRT lane. As the LYNX bus entered the public travel lane, the safety driver onboard P131 engaged the autonomous drive system, and the shuttle proceeded in the BRT lane. After both vehicles had begun moving, P131 in the BRT lane and the LYNX bus in the public travel lane, the LYNX bus reentered the BRT lane encroaching on the shuttles path. The bus failed to provide adequate clearance and contacted the left front side of P131. Both vehicles stopped in the BRT lane after the collision. Within five (5) minutes of the collision, all passengers had safely alighted from the shuttle with no reported injuries and left the scene without giving statements. At approximately 2:20PM, the City of Orlando Police Department (OPD) arrived on scene to investigate the incident. Beep and LYNX supervisors were on scene to support the investigation. OPD collected statements from both the Beep safety driver and LYNX bus driver. The LYNX supervisor provided OPD access to the LYNX bus camera footage on scene, at which point the investigating officer made a verbal indication that the LYNX bus driver appeared to be at fault for the collision. Beeps safety driver was subsequently subjected to a standard post-collision drug and alcohol screening. 1.The safety driver did not exhibit complete situational awareness and per their after-incident interview, failed to notice the bus prior to departing the station. Had the attendant continued to look and check behind/alongside P131 prior to departing the station, the collision may have been avoided. 2.The safety driver attempted to stop the shuttle by disengaging the ADS using the HMI rather than using the emergency stop button. Use of the emergency stop would have increased the deceleration rate to 5 m/s2, decreasing the stopping distance of the shuttle. However, it is not clear whether use of the emergency stop would have fully avoided the collision given the point at which the LYNX LYMMO bus entered the BRT lane. 3.Deficiencies in the standard operating procedures (SOP) between LYNX and Beep allowed for a bus to be deployed onto the service at the same time as P131. Beep communicated to LYNX that both shuttles were exiting the service area. However, LYNX did not wait for final confirmation that both vehicles had left the route prior to dispatching the LYMMO bus involved in the incident, nor did LYNX notify Beep that a bus had been dispatched. Additional information available upon request.